The application of U.S. antitrust policy toward mergers in the banking industry is based on past research suggesting that there is a trade-off between adverse effects on consumer welfare owing to potentially augmented market power and possible welfare-improving effects arising from efficiency gains. Recent research applying the theory of endogenous sunk fixed costs to the banking industry suggests that the current focus of bank antitrust policy on this trade-off may be misplaced. According to initial results obtained by work along these lines, the presence of endogenous sunk fixed costs arising from non-price competition among banks on the basis of product quality yields a lower bound on concentration in banking markets, implying that a few large banks typically will predominate. This policy brief provides an overview of the current basis of U.S. antitrust policy with regard to bank mergers, outlines the theory of endogenous sunk fixed costs, explains why and how the theory might apply to the banking industry, and evaluates whether antitrust policy should be altered in light of evidence offered to date.
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Introduction
The application of U.S. antitrust policy toward mergers in the banking industry is based on past research suggesting that there is a tradeoff between adverse effects on consumer welfare owing to potentially augmented market power and possible welfare-improving effects arising from efficiency gains. Recent research applying the theory of endogenous sunk fixed costs to the banking industry suggests that the current focus of bank antitrust policy on this trade-off may be misplaced. According to initial results obtained by work along these lines, the presence of endogenous sunk fixed costs arising from non-price competition among banks on the basis of product quality yields a lower bound on concentration in banking markets, implying that a few large banks typically will predominate. Furthermore, the theory suggests that if greater concentration created by a merger results in higher prices of financial services, the reason that prices are higher is not necessarily an expansion of banks' market power. Instead, larger postmerger firms may provide higher-quality services that require them to incur higher fixed costs, which in turn necessitate higher prices in a long-run competitive equilibrium. Consumers, the theory suggests, are willing to pay for these quality enhancements because quality improvements raise consumer welfare. Thus, in many instances-perhaps more than permitted under current bank antitrust policy -bank mergers are likely to be welfareenhancing.
This policy brief provides an overview of the current basis of U.S.
antitrust policy with regard to bank mergers, outlines the theory of endogenous sunk fixed costs, explains why and how the theory might apply to the banking industry, and evaluates whether antitrust policy should be altered in light of evidence offered to date. The main conclusions are as follows. First, the theory of how endogenous sunk fixed costs affect market structure in many industries is both interesting and persuasive. Second, there are compelling reasons to view the banking industry as one to which the theory might well apply. Third, recent research by Dick (2007) provides strong circumstantial evidence favoring the applicability of the theory to banking, along with the subsidiary implication that current antitrust policy fails to give adequate attention to the potential quality-boosting impacts of bank mergers. Fourth, fixed costs of regulatory compliance undoubtedly emerge endogenously as an outcome of a dynamic regulatory interaction between the interests of regulated banks and consumers, yet the role of this source of endogenous sunk fixed costs as an influence on bank market structure has not been considered to date. Fifth and finally, until these regulatory costs are taken fully into account in a full assessment of the applicability of the theory to the structure of the banking industry, it would be unwise for policymakers to alter their present merger guidelines, aside perhaps from incorporating greater attention to the implications of mergers for the quality of banking products.
Banking Antitrust Policy in the United States
Traditional policy-oriented economic analysis of the industrial structure of the banking industry has been guided by two intellectual paradigms: the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) hypothesis and the efficient-structure (ES) theory. The SCP hypothesis proposes that the level of concentration in a banking market influences banks' conduct, which in turn has a bearing on loan and deposit quantities, qualities, interest rates, and other market outcomes that determine consumer welfare. Specifically, the SCP hypothesis suggests that greater concentration gives banks more market power, which in turn leads to fewer loans and deposits and higher loan rates and lower deposit rates, all of which reduce consumer welfare.
The ES theory suggests that cost conditions faced by banks play a crucial role in determining the optimal scale of individual banking organizations and the appropriate scope of banking activities. Thus, in contrast to the SCP hypothesis, the ES theory indicates that greater costs efficiencies resulting from expansions of scale and/or scope can lead both to expansions in loans and deposits, with associated lower loan rates and higher deposit rates. Once a geographic region has been identified as the relevant banking market, the relevant item sold in that market by banks must be identified.
The 1963 Supreme Court ruling determined that item to be "the cluster of products and services" offered by banks but did not specify a definition of the appropriate "cluster" to be considered in banking antitrust analysis. In In evaluating planned consolidations of nonfinancial firms, the U.S.
Department of Justice considers a market to be unconcentrated if its HHI is less than 1,000, to be moderately concentrated if its HHI is between 1,000 and 1,800, and to be highly concentrated if its HHI exceeds 1,800. http://cassidi.stlouisfed.org/, provides access to HHI data that prospective partners can utilize to assess the prospects for approval of a contemplated merger. Nevertheless, recent research suggests that it is conceivable that the merger guidelines are based on faulty economic reasoning.
The Theory of Endogenous Sunk Fixed Costs: An Overview
Economists typically presume that a key long-run objective of any firm is to attain a cost-minimizing scale and scope of operations and that, given attainment of this minimum-cost objective, the firm continually adjusts its balance sheet with an aim to maximize profits. According to this perspective, a firm's only sunk costs are costs of entry and setup that are outside of its control. A predictable consequence is that, as the size of an industry's market expands, perhaps through growth in income or population, incumbent firms in an industry should reach their efficient scales. As profits increase, additional firms should enter and should as well pursue output expansions toward efficient scales. Thus, as market size expands, there should be an increase in the number of firms and an accompanying decline in each firm's market share. Consequently, an increase in market size eventually should lead to a reduction in concentration. Sutton (1991) proposes that in some industries sunk costs may be
endogenous. An important consequence, Sutton suggests, is that industry structure may remain static even in a growing market. Firms in industries with endogenous sunk fixed costs, Sutton suggests, select a stream of fixed outlays on items such as research and development, advertising, or other characteristics that enhance the demands for their products. As a result, an expansion in market size encourages firms to proportionately increase their fixed expenses relating to such items in an effort to boost consumers' willingness to pay. As firms' fixed costs increase because of outlays aimed at boosting product demands, however, their profits decline, which removes the incentive for additional rivals to enter the market. In Sutton's framework with endogenous sunk fixed costs, therefore, steady increases in market size ultimately generate no further increases in the number of firms. Hence, concentration eventually reaches a lower bound as market size continues to expand.
Sutton provides a three-stage theory of industry entry and competition. In the first stage, a potential competitor decides whether or not to enter the industry in light of the entry cost that would be entailed. In the second stage, each firm chooses a level of product quality to maximize its profits, taking into account the facts that a higher quality level will expand the demand for its product, that selecting a higher quality level entails a higher fixed cost, and that rival firms will be making quality decisions in the same manner. In the third stage, each firm decides how much of its product to produce with an aim to maximize product and taking into account the profit-maximizing outputs of other competitors.
Sutton shows that an end result of this three-stage process typically is a relationship of the type displayed in Figure 2 . Initially, as market size expands-that is, income increases or population rises-from a relatively low range of values, there is an increase in the number of firms that can earn sufficient accounting profits to compensate owners for the opportunity cost of allocating their resources to the particular industry in question instead of some other industry. Beyond a critical market size, however, the number of firms in the industry declines and eventually levels off at or below an upper bound. Thus, there is a lower bound on concentration in an industry in which endogenous sunk outlays on product quality are an important dimension of market rivalry. In effect, such an industry is a "natural oligopoly" that tends to settle out at a long-run equilibrium either with a relatively small number of firms when firms face similar cost structures and offer only slightly differentiated products or a few large firms and perhaps several fringe firms when firms possess different technologies and offer highly differentiated products. Initially, work along these lines focused on the idea that when confronted with legal deposit rate ceilings, banks offered "implicit interest"
on deposits. For instance, Barro and Santomero (1972) Startz (1983) , Merris (1985) , and Bradley and Jansen (1986 Dick (2006) explores the impacts of U.S. banking deregulation during the 1990s on branch banking. She finds that banks responded by competing through a significant expansion in the number of branches, which together with other adjustments in the deregulated environment boosted operating costs considerably. Increased branching generated greater revenues, however. On net, therefore, she concludes that bank profits were unaffected and, additionally, there was virtually no adjustment in banking market concentration-a result consistent with Sutton's proposed endogenoussunk-cost mechanism.
Sutton initially applied his theory to industries in which advertising is a commonly utilized approach to trying to boost consumers' willingness to pay. Could outlays on advertising also represent a form of endogenous sunk costs that make his theory applicable to the banking industry?
Unfortunately, there are a limited number of studies on the economic impacts of advertising in the banking industry. Martín-Oliver and Sals- Dick considers various measures of bank quality, including advertising intensity (outlays as a fraction of assets), branch density (branches per square mile in a regional market), and alternative measures such as employees per branch, salary per employee, and number of states in which a bank operates. She finds that, consistent with the Sutton model, each of these potential measures of quality increases with market size. She also concludes that within a given market, larger banks typically provide higher levels of quality than smaller banks do, a result that turns out to be consistent with an implication of Sutton's theory when extended to heterogeneous banks offering highly differentiated products.
Thus, Dick provides evidence that endogenous sunk costs could well be an important characteristic of competition in the banking industry. If this conclusion is justified, then banking is an example of a "natural oligopoly," and antitrust analysis may be overly focused on industry concentration. In particular, the current critical post-merger HHI value of 1,800 and change in HHI of 200 specified by U.S. bank merger guidelines conceivably could be inconsistent with the banking industry's "natural" structure. Furthermore, in principle the average level of quality of banks' products could be enhanced by mergers, implying that more concentrated banking markets conceivably could yield higher welfare for consumers.
Evaluating the Policy Implications of Applying the Theory of Endogenous Sunk Fixed Costs to Banking
Based on the results of her study, Dick (2007) suggests that an important implication for U.S. antitrust policy with respect to banking is that bank quality is a key variable that should be incorporated into policy evaluations of the consumer welfare impacts of changes in structure within banking markets. According to Dick, "if consumers are receiving higher quality and are benefiting as a result, they are not necessarily hurt by…higher prices they have to pay" for the higher quality. By implication, if a bank merger that results in a more concentrated market also boosts the fixed costs associated with the provision of better products made possible, both prices and consumer welfare could rise. In principle, therefore, violations of the critical HHI thresholds specified by U.S. bank merger guidelines actually could yield higher-quality banking products and improvements in consumer welfare.
Much depends, Dick suggests, on whether a proposed merger will maintain rivalry among a few dominant banks and potentially several fringe competitors. Her analysis indicates that as long as scope for active quality competition remains in place, consumer welfare will not necessarily be harmed by a merger that creates a more concentrated banking market.
Dick's analysis is carefully done and very persuasive, which suggests that it be given serious consideration by U.S. banking antitrust authorities. Indeed, endogeneity of regulatory fixed costs is a prediction that naturally flows from key economic theories of regulation, such as theories advanced by Peltzman (1976) and Becker (1983) . These theories suggest that the interaction of lobbying activities by regulated firms and by consumer interests produces a "regulatory equilibrium." Over time, changes in external factors-such as a subprime mortgage crisis-alter the terms of the trade-off between the interests of regulated firms and consumers, resulting in a shift in the nature of the regulatory equilibrium-and hence the magnitudes of fixed costs faced by banks in complying with the shifting terms of regulation that they confront. Banks have considerable input into the process by which regulations are adopted and adapted in response to external events. Hence, a significant portion of the fixed regulatory compliance costs they face arguably are endogenous.
Direct application of Sutton's theory to the banking industry presumes that privately incurred fixed bank expenses-such as those associated with advertising or, as in Dick's (2007) work, branch and ATM networks and other outlays aimed at enhancing product quality-are the primary components of banks' endogenous sunk fixed costs. Available evidence suggests, however, that the majority of regulatory compliance costs are also sunk fixed costs that comprise a considerable portion of banks' noninterest expenses. Work to date on applying Sutton's framework to banking ignores this important source of endogenous sunk fixed costs in the banking industry. Of course, integrating such costs into a Sutton-style theory would require accounting for endogeneity of the process by which a regulatory equilibrium is attained and maintained over time, which likely would be a challenging undertaking.
Regulation has altered, currently impinges on, and will continue to affect significantly the history, present status, and likely future configuration of the banking industry. A key component of banks' sunk fixed costs is compliance costs generated by regulation, which by their nature are both endogenous and subject to influence by banks themselves.
Consequently, to the extent that endogenous sunk fixed costs help to explain the present structure of banking markets, one fundamental reason may well be that an endogenous regulatory framework, rather than a natural, unregulated process may be at least partly-or perhaps even largelyresponsible. Until the likely role of endogenous sunk fixed regulatory costs in determining the equilibrium structure of the banking industry has resolved, policymakers should not accept at face value the notion that banking is a "natural oligopoly."
Conclusion
Sutton's theory of the role of endogenous sunk fixed costs in determining the long-run industry structure is compelling for industries in which advertising and research and development expenses are important factors. Sutton's theory presumes, however, that industries to which it is aimed to apply are unregulated. Thus, it is most clearly applicable to industries confronting minimal forms supervision, such as basic social regulations faced by all firms in an economy.
In light of considerable evidence that the banking industry is characterized by considerable non-price forms of competition on the basis of product quality, the suggestion that banks experience endogenous sunk fixed costs is persuasive. Furthermore, evidence amassed by Dick (2007) provides a compelling circumstantial case favoring applicability of Sutton's theory to the banking industry. As predicted by Sutton's theory, bank market structure does indeed seem to be invariant across markets of differing sizes. Furthermore, quality enhancements that benefit consumers appear to be prevalent in concentrated markets dominated by large banks, also consistent with the theory. An inescapable implication of these results appears to be that present U.S. antitrust policy regarding banking mergers may have been formulated on a false premise. Focusing on a traditionally perceived trade-off between potential augmentations of market power of mergers versus possible merger efficiency enhancements could fail to reflect product-quality improvements and related consumer welfare enhancements that mergers may generate.
Nevertheless, an important element missing from application of the theory of endogenous sunk fixed costs to the banking industry is the important role of regulatory compliance costs. The fixed costs that banks confront in complying with regulations are significant. In addition, the regulatory framework confronted by banks is determined through a dynamic interplay between banks, consumers, and government policymaking. Hence, a substantial portion of fixed regulatory compliance costs are also endogenously determined. To date, the theoretical and empirical analysis of the impact of endogenous sunk fixed costs on the structure and performance of the banking industry has failed to account for regulatory fixed costs. Until it does, the policy implications of endogenous sunk fixed costs for the banking industry will remain unsettled.
